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ABSTRACT
Objectives: Health insurers are increasingly making use of risk-sharing
agreements with drug manufacturers to manage uncertainties regarding
the costs and effectiveness of new drugs. Several risk-sharing models exist
including those based on sales volume, achievement of clinical thresholds,
and achievement of cost-effectiveness thresholds. The objective of this
article is to compare two risk-sharing arrangements and to investigate
conditions under which each is preferable from the perspective of the
payer and the manufacturer.
Methods: We develop two two-period models to compare two risk-
sharing arrangements between a payer and a drug manufacturer in which
there is uncertainty about the effectiveness of the new drug. In the ﬁrst
risk-sharing agreement, the drug is listed on a formulary in the ﬁrst period
but delisted in the second period if the net monetary beneﬁt in the ﬁrst
period is negative. In the second risk-sharing agreement, the manufacturer
pays a rebate in each period if the net monetary beneﬁt in that period is
negative.
Results: We show that the relative performance of the two arrangements
depends on several factors and that neither arrangement is always pre-
ferred. Additionally, we are able to identify situations in which a payer and
a manufacturer would prefer the same plan and other situations in which
the two parties would disagree on which plan was most desirable.
Conclusions: Because neither risk-sharing arrangement is always pre-
ferred, payers and manufacturers must carefully consider the characteris-
tics of their individual situation when entering into such contracts.
Keywords: pharmaceutical advertising, pharmaceutical pricing, rebates,
risk sharing.
Introduction
Prescription drug spending is the fastest rising component of
overall health-care spending in many countries. Among Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries,
drug spending increased by an average of 6.1% annually from
1998 to 2005 and in most countries outpaced growth in total
health-care spending and growth in overall Gross Domestic
Product [1]. The increases in prescription drug spending may be
due to increased sales of existing drugs as well as increasing
availability of new and expensive drugs [2]. For example, some
new drugs such as enzyme replacement therapies, cancer drugs,
and the “biologics” can cost more than $100,000 per year.
To manage the costs and risks associated with new and
expensive drugs, many payers have instituted formulary approval
guidelines. Formulary submission guidelines requiring a cost-
effectiveness analysis and a budget impact analysis are common.
Nevertheless, the future effectiveness and demand for a drug are
unknown at the time that formulary listing decisions are made,
meaning that estimates of sales volume, effectiveness or cost-
effectiveness may not be achieved. Several “risk-sharing”
arrangements have been developed to spread the risks associated
with drug budgets, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness between
payers and manufacturers and thus alleviate some of the con-
cerns about uncertainty.
There are several different forms of risk-sharing agreements.
Taylor et al. describe a risk-sharing system in which a new drug
is entered into the health-care system on a trial basis [3]. If the
drug achieves its target outcomes, then it will be funded on an
ongoing basis. If it does not, then it will be removed from the
health-care system and the manufacturer must pay the costs
incurred to date [3]. A similar idea can be used at the level of the
individual patient in which all patients are given a new drug for
a trial period. Those who respond according to predeﬁned clini-
cal criteria would be allowed to continue, although those who do
not respond would switch to an alternate treatment and have
their drug costs up to that point reimbursed by the manufacturer.
This is similar to the recently announced model for bortezomib
(Velcade) in the United Kingdom [4]. Price-volume agreements
are widely used [5], and much has been written about the UK
National Health Service (NHS) risk-sharing plan for multiple
sclerosis which involves the monitoring of patients for 10 years
and payment of a rebate if a predetermined cost-effectiveness
threshold is not achieved (e.g., [6,7]).
Although some see such risk-sharing arrangements as an
innovative solution to a difﬁcult problem, there are criticisms of
some of the speciﬁc arrangements. Sudlow and Counsell, for
example, criticized a risk-sharing plan between the UK NHS and
the manufacturers of interferon beta and glatiramer acetate [7].
They argued that the money “would be better spent on indepen-
dent research” as it pushes drugs with only limited, biased, and
short-term data to the market prematurely.
Despite the growing use of risk-sharing arrangements and
their intuitive appeal to policy makers, there has been little
academic research on the topic. Zaric and O’Brien [8] analyzed a
manufacturer’s optimal response to a price-volume agreement.
Claxton [9] discussed value-based pricing, in which manufactur-
ers set prices according to known willingness-to-pay levels. Coyle
et al. [10] discussed the concept of stratiﬁed cost-effectiveness
analysis as a way for payers to set limited use conditions to
maximize net beneﬁts. Zaric [11] generalized the approach of
Coyle et al. [10] to allow for continuously variable strata. This
model was used to address the question of how a manufacturer
would optimally set prices and limited use conditions in antici-
pation of limited use conditions being imposed by a payer.
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Several other risk-sharing frameworks are possible [12] but there
appears to be little, if any, publicly available formal analysis of
these options.
A complicating factor in the design of risk-sharing agree-
ments is the fact that promotional campaigns, such as advertising
to physicians, direct-to-consumer advertising, physician detail-
ing, sponsoring research studies, and educational seminars, all of
which can increase sales, can take place after formulary decisions
have been made. Research consistently shows that pharmaceuti-
cal advertising is effective in increasing sales (e.g., [13,14]). Pro-
motional effort could lead to off-label use, use outside of that
speciﬁed by limited use conditions, use in groups where cost-
effectiveness has not been demonstrated, or use that exceeds
amounts predicted in the original budget impact analysis.
In this article, we compare two risk-sharing arrangements:
delisting after a trial period and rebates based on net monetary
beneﬁt (NMB). The objective of this article is to compare the two
arrangements and to investigate conditions under which either
risk arrangement is preferable from the perspective of the payer
and the manufacturer. Our analysis includes explicit modeling of
the effect of marketing efforts by manufacturers. To our knowl-
edge, there is no research that considers how manufacturers are
likely to make pricing and marketing decisions in the presence of
risk-sharing agreements.
Basic Model
We develop two two-period models of risk-sharing contracts
between a manufacturer and a payer. The manufacturer has
developed a new drug and wants to include it on the payer’s
formulary. In both models, the manufacturer chooses the price as
well as the level of promotional effort in period i, i = 1,2, to
maximize the expected net present value of total proﬁt. All
notations are summarized in Table 1.
Before period 1, the manufacturer submits an application for
the drug to be included on the payer’s formulary. The applica-
tion includes the price, p, for both periods. We assume that
payer enforces the constraint, pMin  p  pMax, where pMin and
pMax are exogenous. We use the term “marketing” to refer to all
promotional activities, including but not limited to advertising,
promotion, and physician detailing, which serve to increase total
sales. Let mi be the amount spent on marketing and let
N p m km pi i in,( ) = −1 2 1 2 be the total market size in period i as a
function of marketing effort and price, where n represents the
population size and k is a constant representing the maximum
fraction of the market that could ever be reached (and thus n ¥ k
is the maximum market size). This demand curve is a special
case of a Cobb–Douglas demand function [15] with a = 1/2,
b = -1/2.
Let Ei be the average incremental effectiveness of the new
drug per person, relative to the current standard of care. We
assume that, because the drug is new, the only information avail-
able Ei, is derived from the clinical trials leading to regulatory
approval of the drug. We assume that Ei is a measure of effec-
tiveness, such as life years or quality-adjusted life years. Never-
theless, Ei could also be measured in any units that describe
health beneﬁts, including symptom-free days or various disease-
speciﬁc measures, such as tumor size or viral load, provided that
the payer values such beneﬁts. Because of the limited scope and
the controlled conditions of such trials, the true effectiveness of
the drug in the population covered by the payer is unknown and
Ei is thus considered to be a random variable. Let fi(·) and Fi(·) be
the probability density function and cumulative density function
of Ei. The distribution of Ei could be used in setting pMax and pMin,
for example, by requiring a minimum probability that the new
drug would be cost-effective.
Let C be the incremental change in the cost of other health-
care consumption due to the use of this drug, per person. The
term C includes the cost of health care displaced (or added) as a
result of the new drug but does not include the cost of the new
drug itself. The incremental cost C can be positive or negative
depending on whether the new drug leads to increased or reduced
expenses in the future. For example, a situation where a relatively
inexpensive drug prevents the need for expensive surgery could
result in C < 0, whereas a situation in which the new drug must
be administered intravenously in a hospital setting could result in
C > 0.
Let l be the payer’s willingness to pay for each unit of beneﬁt
(in the same units as used for Ei) and U be the number of units of
the drug consumed per patient in period i. We deﬁne the total
NMB in period i as NMBi = Ni(p, mi) ¥ (lEi - C - pU) = (market
size) ¥ (average NMB per person).
We analyze two risk-sharing arrangements based on NMB,
delisting and rebates, deﬁned as follows.
Delisting
The drug is sold in period 1 at price p. If NMB1 < 0, then the drug
is delisted and not sold in period 2. Otherwise, the manufacturer
is allowed to continue to sell the drug at price p in period 2 (i.e.,
the drug is delisted if the net monetary beneﬁt in the ﬁrst period
is negative).
Rebates
The drug is sold in each period at price p. In either period, if
NMBi < 0, then the manufacturer pays a rebate Ri = -NMBi; if
NMBi > 0, then there is no rebate (i.e., if the NMB is negative in
any period, then the manufacturer pays a rebate that is exactly
large enough to make the NMB equal to zero).
In this model, “risk” is deﬁned by uncertainty in effectiveness
(Ei). In particular, the risk is that effectiveness is not high enough
to allow the new drug to demonstrate “value for money” (through
positive net beneﬁts). This risk is shared in the ﬁrst contract by
Table 1 Summary of notation
Manufacturer’s objective
E(P) Expected proﬁt
Manufacturer’s decisions
p Price
mi Marketing in period i
Calculated quantities
N(p,mi) Market size in period i
E(Ri) Expected value of the rebate in period i
NMBi Net monetary beneﬁt in period i
Parameters
i Index over time periods
l Payer’s willingness to pay threshold
C Incremental healthcare costs not including the
new drug
U Average number of units of the drug consumed
per patient per period
Ei Average effectiveness of the new drug in period i
F, f CDF and PDF of Ei
a, b Parameters of the distribution of effectiveness
a, b, n, k, sm, sp Demand function parameters
g Cost function parameter
d Discount factor per period
Ratios
P* Optimal proﬁt
B* Total beneﬁts purchased
S* Optimal market size
CDF, cumulative density function; PDF, probability density function.
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requiring the drug to be pulled from the market if it cannot
demonstrate value for money in the ﬁrst period. Risk is shared in
the second contract by requiring the manufacturer to pay a rebate
to the payer in each period if positive net beneﬁts are not observed.
Both contracts depend on the NMB in each period. The
expression for NMB can be rearranged to see that the NMB
is negative if E < (C + pU)/l. Let q be the probability that
the drug is delisted at the end of period 1 in A1,
given by q f e de
C pU
= ( )
−∞
+
∫ 1 1 1λ (i.e., q is the probability that the
effectiveness is less than (C + pU)/l). Let E[Ri] be the
expected rebate in period i in A2, given by
E R N p m C pU e f e de
C pU
i i i i i i i i[ ] = ( ) × + −( ) ( )
−∞
+
∫, λλ (i.e., E[Ri] is the
weighted value of the rebate for all instances in which the effec-
tiveness is less than (C + pU)/l).
Let pi be the manufacturer’s proﬁt in period i, and let P be the
total two-period proﬁt. We assume that the unit production cost
is small and can be ignored, and we ignore allocated ﬁxed costs.
Let d be the one-period discount factor (where d = 1 corresponds
to no discounting). In A1, proﬁt in each period is given by
pi = pUNi(p, mi) - mi = price ¥ (units/person) ¥ (market size) -
market cost, and the total proﬁt is P = p1 + d[1 - q]p2 (i.e., proﬁt
in the ﬁrst period plus the discounted proﬁt in the second period,
multiplied by the probability that the drug does not get delisted).
In A2, proﬁt in each period is given by
πi i i i price units person
market size marke
= ( ) − − = × ( ) ×
( ) −
pUN p m m R,
ting cost rebate−
and total proﬁt is P = p1 + dp2.
To determine the optimal price and marketing effort, the
manufacturer solves the following optimization problems:
A max1
1
1 2
1 1 1
2 2 2
( ) = ( ) − +
−( ) ( ) −[ ]
p m m
pUN p m m
q pUN p m m
, ,
,
,
Π
δ (1)
s t Min Max. . p p p≤ ≤ (2)
A max2
1 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
( ) = ( ) − − [ ] +
( ) − − [ ][ ]
p m m
pUN p m m E R
pUN p m m E R
, ,
,
,
Π
δ (3)
s t Min Max. . p p p≤ ≤ (4)
(A1) and (A2) above are formal statements of optimization
problems in which the manufacturer chooses p, m1 and m2 to
maximize a proﬁt function subject to constraints on price.
Analysis
Results in this section are based on a special case in which
effectiveness, Ei, is uniformly distributed between a and b,
b  a  0, in both periods (i.e., F(e) = (e - a)/(b - a)). With this
additional assumption, it is straightforward to ﬁnd the optimal
price (p*), marketing effort in each period (m1* and m2*),
and expected proﬁt (P*). The results shown in Table 2 are
for C  1/2l(a + b) and p  (lb - C)/U. When p > pMax =
(lb - C)/U, a rebate is always paid. This case will be discussed
separately in the Model Extensions section. If C > 1/2l(a + b),
then the value of p* calculated in Table 2 would always be larger
than pMax. Nevertheless, the formula for p* was generated under
the assumption that p < pMax.
It is not possible to derive meaningful algebraic comparisons
between A1 and A2. Thus, we compared the two risk-sharing
arrangements numerically. We constructed an example with base
case parameter values n = 1000, k = 0.005, U1 = U2 = 100,
l = 50,000, C = 1000, d = 1, a = 0.5 and b = 1. Preliminary
analysis demonstrated the importance of C, l, and the ratio a/b
so our presentation will focus on these three parameters. For the
uniform distribution, when a  0 (i.e., when average beneﬁts are
always positive), the ratio a/b can be interpreted as a measure of
the magnitude of the uncertainty in effectiveness; when a/b is
small, a is much smaller than b and uncertainty in effectiveness is
large because there is a wide range of possible effectiveness
values, whereas a/b is large, there is relatively little uncertainty in
effectiveness because there is a narrow range for possible
effectiveness values. We set pMax = (lb - C)/U and pMin =
max{(la - C)/U,0}. These deﬁnitions ensure that 0  q  1 (i.e.,
a technical constraint to ensure that the probability of observing
negative NMB in the ﬁrst period is between 0 and 1) and that
p*  0. We deﬁne P* as the ratio of the manufacturer’s optimal
proﬁt under A2 to the optimal proﬁt under A1; B* is the ratio of
total expected beneﬁts purchased by the payer under A2 to total
beneﬁts purchased under A1 when the manufacturer chooses
price and marketing effort optimally, and S* as the ratio of the
optimal market size in the ﬁrst period under A2 to the optimal
market size in the ﬁrst period under A1.
We ﬁrst evaluated S* for different values of C and a/b (Fig. 1).
The optimal market size under A1 is constant with respect to
Table 2 Optimal solutions for the case of E~U(a, b)
Delisting Rebates
E(P)* 1
2 2 2
1
2U k
U
Cn C( ) −( ) − +( ) + + −( )
−( )
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
λ β α δ δλβ
δ
δ δ λα
λ β α 1 2
2 2
+( ) ( ) − ( )( )δ n * **k Up E Rp
p* λ β α δ δλβ
δ
−( ) − +( )C2 U λβ λβ λα−[ ] + −[ ] + −[ ]C C CU 2 233
m1* U k
U
n C
2 2
2( ) −( ) − +λ β α δ δλβδ n * * *k p Up E R2 12 2( ) − ( )( )
m2* U k
U
n C
2 2
2( ) −( ) − +λ β α δ δλβδ nk p Up E R2 12 2( ) − ( )( )* * *
P(delisted)
1 1
2
1β α λδ λ β α δ δ δλα−
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ ( ) −( ) +( ) + −( )C N/A
E(Ri) N/A
C p U+ −( )
−( )
* λα
λ β α
2
2
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these parameters. In all instances, S* was less than 1, indicating
a smaller market size under rebates than under delisting. The
ratio S* was increasing in a/b, indicating that the optimal market
sizes for the two types of contracts were closer together as the
uncertainty in effectiveness decreased. The ratio S* was decreas-
ing in C, indicating that the optimal market sizes grew farther
apart as nondrug incremental costs increased. For a/b  0.8, the
ratio was always greater than 0.9. Thus, when there is relatively
little uncertainty in effectiveness, the optimal market size is
approximately the same under both agreements, regardless of
incremental costs. For a/b = 0 (the widest possible range of
uncertainty in effectiveness) the ratio of market sizes is highly
dependent on incremental costs. For example, when C =
-25,000, indicating cost savings, S* is approximately 0.85,
whereas when C = 25,000 the market size ratio is approximately
0. Thus, when rebates are used and there are high nondrug
incremental costs and high uncertainty in effectiveness, price and
marketing effort will be chosen so that there will be very low
sales volume.
Figure 2 shows P* for different combinations of willingness
to pay (l) and nondrug incremental costs (C). Positive values of
C are shown in Figure 2a and negative values of C are shown in
Figure 2b. Several points are not shown in Figure 2a, corre-
sponding to cases in which there is no feasible solution. For
example, when C = 100,000, there is no feasible solution if
l < 100,000 as the maximum possible beneﬁt in this example is
1, for which the monetary value of health beneﬁts could never
exceed the nondrug incremental costs.
For positive C (Fig. 2a), the ratio P* is increasing in l and
decreasing in C. Thus, as the payer’s willingness to pay for
beneﬁts increases, the manufacturer is more likely to prefer
rebates over delisting, and as the nondrug incremental costs
increase, the manufacturer is more likely to prefer delisting over
rebates. For all cases, P* increases in l and reaches a maximum
value of approximately 1.12. The ratio P* may be greater than or
less than 1, which suggests that the preferred alternative, from
the manufacturer’s perspective, depends on the relationship
between C and l. In instances where P* < 1, P* can be signiﬁ-
cantly less than 1, whereas in instances where P* > 1, the ratio
tends to be close to 1. This suggests that, although it is possible
for either contract to be better for the manufacturer, a risk-averse
manufacturer may prefer delisting over rebates when C > 0.
Figure 2b shows P* for cases when C < 0 (i.e., use of the new
drug leads to cost savings elsewhere). In all instances of P* > 1
suggesting that the manufacturer always earns higher proﬁts with
rebates compared with delisting when the nondrug incremental
costs are negative. Each curve is nonmonotonic (neither strictly
increasing nor strictly decreasing) in l and peaks at approxi-
mately 1.14 before sloping down again to approximately 1.12.
This results in P* also being nonmonotonic in C.
Figure 3 shows B* and P* as functions of a/b for different
values of C. Four regions are labeled on the graphs. In region A
(which only occurs for the case of C = 10,000 in Fig. 3c), B* and
P* are both less than 1, indicating that the payer purchases fewer
total beneﬁts and the manufacturer earns lower proﬁts under A2
than under A1. In region B, B*  1 and P*  1, indicating that
the payer purchases more beneﬁts and that the manufacturer
earns lower proﬁts under A2 than under A1. In region C, B* and
P*  1, meaning that both beneﬁts and proﬁts are greater under
A2 than under A1. Finally, in region D, P*  1 and B*  1. If a
new drug had characteristics such as range of effectiveness and
nondrug incremental cost, which placed it in zone A, then both
parties would likely prefer a delisting arrangement over a rebates
arrangement. If the contract fell in zone C, then both parties
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Figure 1 Ratio of optimal market sizes.
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would likely prefer a rebates arrangement. If the contract fell in
zone B or zone D, then the two parties would likely disagree on
which option was preferable.
The existence of the four regions of Figure 3 with their differ-
ent interpretations suggests that manufacturers and payers may
have differing perspectives on which arrangement is preferred.
There are two reasons why these disagreements may arise. There
may be a difference of perception or estimation, in which the two
parties disagree on the parameter estimates and hence on the
region. Alternately, there may be an intrinsic difference between
the contracts in which both parties agree on all parameter esti-
mates, but these estimates place the contracts in region B or D.
Figure 4 shows P*, B* and the value of the incremental
cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) in the optimal solution to A1
divided by l as a function of a/b for C = 0 and l = 50,000.
Graphs for other values of C are qualitatively similar and offer
similar insights. The graph for the optimal ICER under A2
divided by l is not shown because, with the rebate policy that we
consider, this ratio is always less than 1. Additionally, it varies in
a narrow range between 0.89 and 0.99 for this particular exam-
ple. Four regions are shown on the graph corresponding to the
regions between the points where one of these lines crosses 1. In
regions B and C, both parties prefer A2 because P* and B* are
both greater than 1. Although the manufacturer prefers A1 in
region A, the expected ICER throughout this region exceeds l,
and the payer would purchase more health beneﬁts under A2. In
contrast, in region D, the manufacturer would prefer A2, and the
ICER of A2 is less than l throughout this region.
To better understand Figure 4, we describe two instances in
greater detail. We note that under A1, optimal marketing effort
(mi*) and market size (Ni*) are independent of model parameters
a, b, C and l (Table 2). This is not the case for A2 because mi*,
and hence Ni*, both depend on the expected rebate (E[Ri]) which
is a function of a, b, C and l.
First, consider a/b = 0.1 (i.e., relatively high uncertainty
about future effectiveness) with other parameters as in the base
case. Under delisting, it is optimal to set a price of approximately
95% of the upper limit pMax. This results in the expected ICER in
the ﬁrst period being 1.7 times greater than l and a 94% chance
that the drug will be delisted at the end of the ﬁrst period. Under
rebates, the optimal price is only 67% of pMax. The manufacturer
spends much less on marketing under rebates compared with
delisting, resulting in a total market size that is only 73% as large
under rebates as under delisting. The beneﬁts purchased in period
1 are thus only 73% as great as under delisting but the total
expected beneﬁts purchased over both periods under rebates is
greater than under delisting because the drug is always sold in
both periods under rebates, yet has only a 6% chance of being
available in the second period under delisting. The expected
rebate is relatively high at 27% of total sales because uncertainty
about effectiveness is high.
Next, consider a/b = 0.8 (i.e., relatively low uncertainty in
effectiveness). Under delisting, the optimal price is 80% of the
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maximum, resulting in a probability of being delisted of 0 (i.e.,
the price is set so that, regardless of effectiveness, it would be
cost-effective). Under rebates, the optimal price is higher and set
at approximately 90% of the maximum possible price. The
manufacturer spends slightly more on marketing under rebates
than under delisting. The net result of the higher price (which
reduces demand) and greater marketing expenditures (which
increase demand) is a market size that is 97% as large under
rebates as under delisting. Because the probability of being
delisted under delisting is 0, the expected total beneﬁts are 97%
as great under rebates as they are under delisting. Because there
is little uncertainty in effectiveness, the expected rebate is only
3% of sales in rebates.
Model Extensions
No Upper Bound on Prices
The above analyses all made use of an upper bound pMax on
prices for both contracts. For the case of delisting, it is necessary
to have an upper limit on price because without an upper limit it
would be optimal for the manufacturer to set an arbitrarily high
price, thus earning arbitrarily large proﬁts in period 1, while
ignoring period 2. However, when rebates are used, the rebates
may induce the manufacturer to self-regulate when setting prices.
We investigated whether there would be instances under rebates
when it would be optimal to choose a price so that a rebate is
always paid (i.e., to choose p* > pMax = (lb - C)/U).
Our analysis suggests that it would never be optimal to
choose p > pMax. When p  pMax, corresponding to the case
examined in earlier sections, the solution p* = pMax is possible
but this will not be the solution in general.
A potential concern among policy makers and formulary
managers about the use of rebate schemes is that they will merely
encourage manufacturers to set high prices, always pay rebates,
and extract the payer’s full willingness to pay for beneﬁts. The
above analysis suggests that the optimal price will always result
in the payer receiving some net monetary beneﬁt, except for the
special case where there is no uncertainty in effectiveness, which
is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. This result
occurs because demand in this model is price sensitive, and
beyond a certain point, increases in price are offset by decreases
in demand.
More Than Two Periods
We extended the model to a multiperiod framework to investi-
gate whether some of the results obtained previously were a
result of using a two-period framework rather than to features of
the risk-sharing arrangements themselves. This could be particu-
larly important in the case of delisting, where it may make sense
in a two-period model to sacriﬁce sales in the second period in
exchange for a higher price in the ﬁrst period. For longer time
horizons, this behavior may cease to be optimal as the value of
the future sales that are sacriﬁced would increase.
First, consider rebates. For rebates, the extension to multiple
periods does not change the optimal values p* and mi*. This is
because the optimal marketing is the same in each period
(m1* = m2* = . . . = mt*) and the problem reduces to the same
two-variable problem as in the two-period model.
Next, consider delisting. We are able to extend the time
horizon to inﬁnitely many periods. This could serve as an
approximation to a case with a very long remaining time horizon
or a high discount rate (i.e., low d). In this case, we ﬁnd that there
are only two possible optimal solutions: either set p* = pMin or set
p* = pMax. When p* = pMin, this ensures that the drug is never
delisted and is sold in every period. When p* = pMax, the drug is
always delisted after the ﬁrst period. The manufacturer will earn
the largest possible proﬁt in the ﬁrst period and ignore all future
periods. The ﬁrst result, setting p* = pMin to ensure sales in every
period when the length of the time horizon grows, seems intui-
tive, but the latter result does not so we explore it in more detail.
One condition in which it is optimal to ignore future periods
is b(1 - d)  a and C  0, which corresponds to positive non-
drug incremental costs and maximum possible effectiveness sub-
stantially larger than the minimum possible effectiveness (i.e.,
relatively large uncertainty in effectiveness). A subcase is d = 1
(no discounting), a = 0 (some possibility of no beneﬁts) and
C  0 (nondrug incremental costs are positive). A second condi-
tion is d = 1 (no discounting) and C  la  0 (nondrug incre-
mental costs are greater than willingness to pay for the lowest
possible level of beneﬁt).
Other Changes in the Basic Model Setup
In the analysis presented thus far, we have assumed that Ei is
uniformly distributed, Ci ≡ C, and N p m km pi i in,( ) = −1 2 1 2. We
also investigated generalizations of these assumptions. In particu-
lar, we let Ei be normally distributed rather than uniformly
distributed; we deﬁned the incremental cost per person Ci as
Ci(Ni) = C + gNi; and we considered two new forms for the
demand function, a more general multiplicative model,
N p m km pa bi i in,( ) = − , 0 < a < 1, and b > 0, and a linear model,
N p m k s m s pa p bi i L m i,( ) = + − − , 0 < a < 1, b > 0, sm, sp > 0.
The new incremental cost function Ci(Ni) may be an increas-
ing or decreasing function of the number of individuals using the
new drug. If g > 0, then the incremental cost Ci(Ni) is an increas-
ing function of the number of users. This may occur if the new
drug is used in progressively more marginal groups as the market
expands. If g < 0, then the incremental cost Ci(Ni) is decreasing.
This may occur if there are positive network effects (e.g., drugs
that treat communicable diseases) or if providers become more
experienced with the drug and thus able to derive economies of
scale as they expand to larger numbers of patients.
It is not possible to obtain algebraic solutions using either
demand curve. However, both rebate schemes reduce to two-
variable optimization problems for which solutions can be
obtained through an exhaustive search of all possibilities within
realistic bounds. In the case of delisting, the two variable
problem is obtained by ﬁnding m2*, then substituting m2* into P
and searching over values of m1 and p; in the case of rebates, the
two-variable problem is obtained by observing that m1* = m2*,
substituting m2* into P, and searching over values of m1 and p.
Although the actual solution values differ from those presented in
previous sections, the qualitative insights are similar and are not
presented.
Discussion
In this article, we developed models to evaluate two different
risk-sharing agreements. We compared the two agreements ana-
lytically and using several numerical examples, and we suggested
a number of extensions to the basic two-period model. Our
analysis demonstrated the many complex trade-offs involved in
various risk-sharing arrangements and the viability of using a
combination of analytic and numeric techniques to understand
and compare different risk-sharing arrangements.
This analysis has yielded several important insights. First,
neither of the two arrangements that we evaluated would always
be preferred by either the payer or the manufacturer. This was
shown through the different zones in Figure 3, each of which is
Comparing Risk-sharing Agreements 843
interpreted differently by each party. The different interpretations
could arise from disagreements about various parameter esti-
mates or from features of the agreements themselves. The possi-
bility of conﬂicting preferences would likely continue to hold true
using more realistic assumptions and may also hold true for other
speciﬁcations of risk-sharing plans. There are also instances
when both parties would agree as to which option was prefer-
able, also shown in Figure 3. In zone A, both parties would be
better off with delisting, and in zone C both parties would be
better off with rebates.
Second, two important factors in determining the performance
of the risk-sharing plans are uncertainty in the outcomes and
nondrug incremental costs (expressed in our model by a/b and C,
respectively). It may be necessary to have good estimates of the
values of these quantities to properly understand the impact of
a newly proposed risk-sharing agreement. Third, a potential
concern about the impact of rebate schemes is that the optimal
response by manufacturers will be to set a high price and always
pay a rebate, leaving the payer with no net monetary beneﬁt.
However, we found that this behavior would not be optimal,
suggesting that the concern is unfounded. Fourth, although delist-
ing puts an incentive on the manufacturer to choose a low price
and thus maximizes the probability of remaining on the formulary,
there are instances when it is optimal for the manufacturer to set
the price as high as possible and ignore the second period. Indeed,
even when we extended the time horizon to an inﬁnite period
model we identiﬁed conditions under which it would be optimal
for the manufacturer to ignore all future periods.
The two arrangements that we considered place different
incentives on the manufacturer. Under delisting the payer uses the
threat of delisting to prevent the manufacturer from setting too
high a price. The manufacturer must consider the trade-off
between expected proﬁt in period 1 and total expected proﬁt in
later periods when determining the price and marketing effort.
Under rebates, the rebate is nonnegative by deﬁnition so the
payer is guaranteed a positive or zero NMB, regardless of the
price or the true effectiveness. In this case, the manufacturer’s
choice for price involves a balance between market size (lower
price means larger demand) and proﬁt per unit sold (higher price
means higher per-unit proﬁt).
Two recent articles that describe pharmaceutical risk-sharing
contracts in general, discuss some of the reasons why these
contracts may be useful, and discuss potential difﬁculties in
implementing them [16,17]. The authors offer differing conclu-
sions, with one article arguing that “it is not clear that risk-
sharing will be accepted”, and that risk-sharing agreements will
probably only be attractive in speciﬁc limited situations [17], and
the other concluding that “risk-sharing plans . . . may become a
staple feature of the market [16].” Our analysis suggests that
differing interpretations about the desirability of a particular
contract may be expected.
Our model makes use of the general variable mi to represent
all possible promotional activities. There are several ways in
which drug manufacturers can promote their products. Manu-
facturers traditionally target their advertising efforts toward phy-
sicians using journal advertising and detailing. Although such
campaigns are widely used and have been proven highly success-
ful in promoting sales [18], drug manufacturers are increasingly
using direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) to promote their
drugs directly to the consumers [19]. Recent research suggests
that patients will respond to advertisements by requesting spe-
ciﬁc drugs from their physicians, and that many physicians will
prescribe requested drugs even if they would not prescribe them
otherwise [20,21]. DTCA campaigns may also put pressure on
the public payers to cover the advertised drugs.
The models and analysis that we presented are intended for
risk-sharing agreements with either public sector payers or
private sector payers that are very large and include most local
patients. This is because of the inclusion of the promotional
effort term. Physician detailing and direct to consumer advertis-
ing would be a large component of promotional effort. In regions
where manufacturers have agreements with several payers and
physicians treat patients who belong to several different plans, it
would be difﬁcult to target that effort to the intended patient-
plan combinations.
Transaction and monitoring costs may be important when
considering adopting a risk-sharing plan, and it would be impor-
tant to consider these costs in a comparison of “risk-sharing”
versus “no risk-sharing.” However, we ignored these costs in our
analysis because we compared two risk-sharing contracts, both
of which would involve monitoring of effectiveness.
There are several possible extensions for this model. We com-
pared only two forms of risk-sharing agreement but several
other forms could be considered, such as the bortezomib “war-
ranty” model used by the NHS or price-volume agreements
which are used by several payers. We assumed the same distri-
bution for effectiveness in both periods. However, the effective-
ness observed in the ﬁrst period would probably provide some
information about the effectiveness in the second period and
therefore reduce the uncertainty in effectiveness in that period.
We assumed that E1 and E2 were independent but they may be
correlated. Market size in second period is may be a function of
m1 as well as m2 as early investments might not yield a beneﬁt
until later periods. We assumed that the only source of uncer-
tainty was the effectiveness of the drug. However, for a new drug
there could also be uncertainty regarding incremental costs and
market size, as well as other factors. We assumed that the manu-
facturer would know the payer’s willingness to pay (l) with
certainty, but the manufacturer may only be able to guess this
value based on past experience or results of similar decisions, if
they are publicly available. As a model simpliﬁcation, we
assumed that Ei was the only stochastic term. However, there are
likely to be many uncertain parameters including sales volume
and cost. Future research can incorporate these additional
sources of uncertainty.
Drugs are becoming increasingly expensive, and drug spend-
ing is growing faster than the economy as a whole in many
countries, straining public health-care budgets in the process. If a
payer believes that it is taking on too much risk by adding a drug
to a formulary then this may restrict its ability to reimburse drugs
that could be effective or cost-effective under different circum-
stances. If a manufacturer believes that it is taking on too much
risk then it may avoid listing drugs on certain formularies even
though listing could be proﬁtable under different circumstances.
As drugs become more expensive, continued research on the
design and implementation of risk-sharing contracts will become
increasingly important to continue ensured access.
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